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**Dissertation Title: How Far Can We Understand The Bush Doctrine  
Through The Prism Of The Truman Doctrine?**

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*“Like the Cold War, we are fighting the followers of a murderous ideology that despises freedom, crushes all dissent, has territorial ambitions, and pursues totalitarian aims. Like the Cold War, our enemies are dismissive of free peoples, claiming that men and women who live in liberty are weak and lack the resolve to defend our way of life. Like the Cold War, our enemies believe that the innocent can be murdered to serve a political vision. And like the Cold War, they’re seeking weapons of mass murder that would allow them to deliver catastrophic destruction to our country. If our enemies succeed in acquiring such weapons, they will not hesitate to use them, which means they would pose a threat to America as great as the Soviet Union.”*

- President George W. Bush speaking in May 2006 at the United States Military Academy at West Point (White House 2006)

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# Preface

This dissertation is the focus of a comparison of the foreign policy of Harry S. Truman during the start of the Cold War with the foreign policy of George W. Bush during the start of the War on Terror. The aim of which is to illustrate that the Bush administration has continued with Truman's foreign policy to fight the War on Terror with the understanding that the Truman policies which so successfully defeated the ideological threat of communism, can be used to defeat the new ideological threat of terrorism.

The motivation for this dissertation derives from several issues. Firstly, as Bush comes to the end of his presidency and attention turns away from him and towards his potential successors, it seems an appropriate time to attempt an assessment of the Bush presidency. I have chosen to focus on the Bush administrations foreign policy record in particular as the Bush presidency has come to be defined by its foreign policy decisions and the War on Terror in particular. The reason I am attempting to understand the Bush Doctrine through the prism of the Truman Doctrine is because the Bush presidency was "the most important and controversial in American foreign policy since Truman" (Lynch & Singh 2008, p5) and the similarities between the foreign policy records of both men go much further than this, as this dissertation will illustrate. Whilst much has been written about Bush and the War on Terror it has mostly been a condemnation of his decisions rather than an explanation for them. I think that by comparing Bush's foreign policy to Truman's, I can place the Bush presidency in a historical and political context that will hopefully aid our understanding of the Bush administrations decisions, rather than merely judging them.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter highlights the similarities between the two men and the start of the Cold War and the War on Terror.

The second chapter will look at how both Bush and Truman interpreted the enemy they faced.

Chapter three focuses on the strategy both presidents adopted to fight the enemy, as outlined in the Truman Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine.

Chapter four is a study of the Korean War and the Iraq War drawing comparison between the two wars in terms of the reasons for war, the build-up to war, and the execution of the war amongst.

Chapter five looks at the way both presidents influenced the domestic scene in order to fight their wars more effectively, with the creation of new government agencies and the introduction of new laws.

The dissertation will end with a conclusion which will help to evaluate exactly how far we can understand the Bush Doctrine through the prism of the Truman Doctrine.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all my lecturers at ISA, especially Tim Lynch, for all the help and encouragement they have offered throughout this course.

# Chapter I: History Repeating

*“Truman's Trials Resonate for Bush: President Battling Terrorism Has Shown Interest In Democrat's Strategies at Dawn of Cold War”*

Michael Abramowitz, The Washington Post, 2007

*“As one who remembers the Truman presidency...I often have a sense of déjà vu”*

Fred Greenstein, commenting on the Bush presidency, in The Washington Post, 2007

The suggestion that there are an array of extensive similarities between Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush inevitable invites scorn from liberals who criticize the unilateralism and hard power of the Bush administration. But whilst these two presidents invoke contrasting responses there are great similarities between them and the international situation that confronted them. I will highlight these similarities in the hope they illustrate that Bush has pursued a similar foreign policy to Truman with the understanding that because of “the actions he took, the institutions he built, the alliances he forged and the doctrines he set down, President Truman laid the foundations for America's victory in the Cold War,” (Bush 2006), and so too can Bush do the same for the War on Terror.

Before becoming president, both Truman and Bush had followed a very similar career path. They both served in the army, Truman as an artillery officer in the military and Bush in the Texas Air National Guard, before embarking on a series of business efforts, with Truman setting up his own haberdashery store whilst Bush invested in oil companies. Both men then made the decision to enter politics, and whilst Truman became Senator of Missouri Bush became Governor of Texas. Truman, although having gained a

national reputation as chairman of a Senate committee to investigate waste in the defence industry, had not had a particularly remarkable career as a Senator, but was more renowned for “the homely attributes, the Missouri wit, the warmth of his friendship, the genuineness...” (Weinstein in McPherson 2004 p234). Likewise, Bush it seems “had little to show for his six years as Texas governor, except a reputation for likeability and working well with others” (Chafe in McPherson 2004 p308). Before “their presidencies, neither Truman nor Bush was known for his foreign policy acumen” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p8) and both “possessed modest foreign policy credentials” (Lynch and Singh 2008 p2), instead having been much more concerned with domestic issues, with Truman “having forged his Senate career on domestic concerns” (Lynch and Singh 2008 p2) and Bush as a governor.

Both Truman and Bush “followed popular predecessors who were inspiring communicators respected for their displays of wide-ranging intelligence” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p8). Franklin D. Roosevelt and Bill Clinton, former state governors, were Democrats who were elected for more than one term in Office and whom were popular and well-liked by the American people. Both were considered to be gifted politicians with the ability to empathise and speak to the American people. Their presidential agendas were aimed at formulating international peace and economic prosperity for the US, and both were responsible for leaving the USA to their successors as a richer and more powerful nation than at another time in its history.

Truman and Bush both became president under dubious circumstances. Truman, who had been vice-president for just four months, became president following Roosevelt’s sudden death in April 1945 whilst Bush became president following the US

Supreme Courts controversial decision to stop a recount of the Florida vote. Truman “like Bush, entered the Oval Office with low expectations” (Lynch and Singh 2008 p2), as a result of their relatively undistinguished careers up to that point and because of the popularity of their predecessors. But within the first few months both men, despite the low expectations put upon them, would reach record levels of job approval ratings, as the result of international events which would define their presidencies and change the world forever. Truman received “an 87% rating after the U.S victory in Europe in World War II” (Gallup 2008) whilst Bush earned “an all-time high 90% approval rating following the Sept 11 terrorist attacks” (Gallup 2008). These two events would be directly responsible for leading both presidents to wage a new war of global proportions and, as popularity for their wars waned, would subsequently see their approval ratings plummet to record lows “with Truman averaging below 40% approval during the final three years of his presidency and Bush on his way to matching that” (Gallup 2008).

There are significant similarities between the on-set of the Cold War and the War on Terror. First of all the warning signs of potential conflict appeared much earlier than the actual on-set of war. Whilst the end of World War II signalled the start of the Cold War “with the rapid breakdown of relations between the western allies on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other” (Lynch and Singh 2008 p11), tensions between the US and Soviet Union had begun to worsen much earlier, following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. President Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize the Bolshevik government and it wasn’t until sixteen years later that the US finally resumed normal relations with the Soviet Union, the last major power to do so. Even then, the relationship was fraught with tension and it was “not until the German invasion of Soviet



Union began in June 1941 would the United States and the Soviet Union once again find a way to make common cause on any meaningful issue.” (US State Department a). Any potential confrontation had been interrupted by the out- break of World War II, but following victory, and as a result of that victory, the tensions between the countries would continue and escalate.

Similarly, tension between the US and Islamist regimes began long before the attacks of 9/11. Many scholars in fact point to “the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as having marked the crucial beginning of a conflict between “radical” or “political” Islam and the West” (Lynch and Singh 2008 p11), but US attention to this event was minimal as throughout the 1970’s the Soviet Union had embarked on a period of expansionism. A series of terror attacks by Islamic organizations took place against the US throughout the 1980’s, including bombings at the US embassy in Beirut in April 1983, US army barracks in Beirut in October 1983, at a disco in Berlin in 1986 which was attended by US army personnel, and the Lockerbie disaster of 1988, but the US responses were isolated and minimal, as the US remained firmly focused on the ever-present Soviet threat.

The US and Soviet Union had fought alongside each other during World War II only for victory to lead directly to the Cold War, and the US worked alongside its Islamist enemies during the Cold War only for this to lead to the War on Terror. During World War II the US aligned reluctantly aligned itself with the Soviet Union in an effort to fight Nazism. Roosevelt himself acknowledge the uneasiness in this alliance stating to an old friend “I can’t take communism nor can you, but to cross this bridge I would hold hands with the Devil” (Gaddis 2005 p3). But the alliance was a necessary and successful

one and the “Soviet Mephistopheles helped the United States and Great Britain achieves victory over their enemies in a remarkably short time” (Gaddis 2005 p3).

But as a result of victory in World War II “the Soviet Union had significant assets, despite the immense losses it had suffered” (Gaddis 2007 p9). Stalin “got the territorial acquisitions and the sphere of influence he wanted” (Gaddis 2007 p21) and the “Soviet Union’s borders were moved several hundred miles to the West” (Gaddis 2007 p21). The consequence of the Allied victory was “the rise of an even more powerful and less fathomable totalitarian state, and, as a consequence, a Cold War that lasted ten times longer than the brief and uneasy alliance that won the world war” (Gaddis 2005 p4).

The US worked with its future Islamist enemies during the Cold War and in supporting these Islamist enemies the US set the stage for the War on Terror. In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan over concerns that the pro-Moscow government was unable to suppress the Muslim insurgency. The US responded by supporting the mujahideen, a group of Arab volunteers, in their fight against the Soviet army. The mujahideen had been assembled by the Saudi Royal family, who had empowered “one Usama bin Laden, to recruit, move, train, and indoctrinate the Arab volunteers in Afghanistan” (Clarke 2004 p52) and subsequently “many of these volunteers later became the al Qaeda network” (Clarke 2004 p52). After the Soviet retreat in 1989 Afghanistan collapsed into civil war, and the result was that in 1996 the Taliban took control of Afghanistan and implemented an Islamist anti-American regime which provided protection for and worked with al-Qaeda.

Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq war the US worked with Saddam Hussein to ensure that there would not be an Iranian victory, therefore preventing a wave of Islamic

revolution spreading across the Middle-East. In 1982 the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the list of states that sponsored terrorism and in 1984 resumed full diplomatic relations with Iraq. Iraq was now able “to apply for certain types of US government-backed export promotion loans” (Clarke 2004 p41) and the US supplied Iraq with military intelligence. Also in the 1980’s the US was providing arms to Iran in the now infamous Iran-Contra affair, in order to raise money for anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, in the hope of containing communism in Latin America.

There are parallels between the US position in the world in 1945 and 2001 and Bush believed that the global war against terrorism resonated with Truman’s global war against communism. Truman implemented strategies and structures that would ultimately be responsible for the US victory against the Soviet Union and as such, Bush has followed a similar foreign policy with the understanding that it too will be successful in defeating terrorism. The next few chapters will aim to illustrate this.

## Chapter II: Concept of the Enemy

*“The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world.”*

NSC- 68 (Truman 1950)

*“They hate our freedoms- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other...These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life.”*

President George Bush (Bush 2001b)

Truman believed the US was involved in an ideological battle against the Soviet Union. At the end of World War II this was a unique position to hold as Truman's predecessor, FDR, believed the post-World War II world would “be characterised by spheres of influence and a balance of power” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p25) and that “the USSR would feel secure in such an arrangement and act like a traditional great power” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p25). But “Truman rejected this interpretation of world politics and the Soviet Union” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p25) instead believing that the Soviet Union wanted to extend its Empire. For Truman, the Cold War was a conflict between “alternative ways of life stemming from a fundamental difference in regimes” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p69), between “liberal democracy, which protected the rights of its citizens, and Soviet communism, which ruled by way of terror” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p70), rather than a desire for territory or regional power.

Bush too believes that the War on Terror is a conflict between two competing ideologies, the American one that supports freedom and democracy and the Islamist one that denounces it. Bush believes that “like the Cold War, it’s an ideological struggle between two fundamentally different visions of humanity” (Lynch and Singh 2008 p113). Bush acknowledges that, of the terrorists, “we have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century” (Bush 2001b) and like the communism, Islamists “hate our freedoms...” (Bush 2001b). Bush and Truman saw their enemy as an ideological one that was intent on destroying the American ideals of freedom and democracy and replacing them with a tyrannous regime.

Truman and Bush both adopted an ideological interpretation of their enemy and in doing so defined the conflicts as “fundamentally a struggle between good and evil” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005 p85). Truman and his administration believed that “while American policymakers were governed by “Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise”, Soviet leaders were driven by “fanaticism”, a “messianic” ideology, and implacable hostility” (Hogan 1998 p13). Similarly, the “Soviets were hostile and active...whilst the Americans were friendly, reactive, and usually reluctant” (Hogan 1998 p17). Essentially, Truman felt that the USA was a good state and the Soviet Union represented a “bad” or “evil” state.

Bush’s foreign policy prior to 9/11 had been a realist one which was unconcerned with the liberal interventionism of the Clinton administration. But the events of 9/11 had a revolutionary effect on Bush’s understanding of the world, and he suddenly “saw the conflict as one of civilization against evil that must trump all differences” (Jervis 2005 p52). His speech to the American people on the evening of September 11<sup>th</sup> began

with “Today, our nation saw evil” (Bush 2001a) and he used the word three more times in the four minute address. The morning after 9/11 “Bush declared that the United States was engaged “in a monumental struggle of good versus evil” (Jervis 2005 p55). Three days later “he told mourners at the National Cathedral, “Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005 p86). While “such a world view is consistent with the American political tradition, it also owes something to Bush’s outlook as a born-again Christian” (Jervis 2005 p55). Because Bush, like Truman brought to his foreign policy “the convictions of his religious faith” (Edwards and Spalding 2006 p27) and his ability to define the US as good and its enemies as evil derives from his Christian faith.

Historians have often ignored how much Truman’s religion influenced his politics “yet religion was important to Truman and his worldview” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p205). Truman saw the Soviet Union as a threat to freedom, and especially to freedom of religion, stating that “international communism was opposed to the tenets, including the right to worship God, which Americans lived by and cherished” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p214). Truman believed that the most important principle of American civilization was freedom and that that freedom was based on moral principles which derived from Christianity, reiterating that “the American republic was founded on the same principles of the moral law taught by the great religions” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p214). He placed the Cold War in a religious context, believing that “God had created us and brought us to our present position of power and strength for some great purpose” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p215) and that purpose was “to defend “the spiritual values-the moral code- against the vast forces of evil that seek to destroy them” (Edwards Spalding 2006 p217).

Bush too, has placed the War on Terror in a religious context. On the evening of 9/11 Bush claimed that God was with the US and quoted the Twenty-Third Psalm, “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me”. Just nine days after the terrorist attacks Bush declared that freedom and fear were at war “and we know that God is not neutral between them” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005 p86). Like Truman, Bush also believes it is the purpose of the US to serve God’s will. When accepting the Republican nomination in 2004 Bush declared that “like governments before us, we have a calling from beyond the stars to stand for freedom” (Albright 2006 p160) and throughout his presidency he has “frequently alluded to God’s support for his efforts” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005 p86) and has “openly proclaimed America to be an instrument of God’s will” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005 p87).

What I hope to have illustrated with this chapter is that Truman and Bush understood the enemy in the same way. They both saw their conflicts as being ideological in nature, rejecting any realist interpretations about power politics. Both men believed it was a moral battle between good and evil with the US representative of good and the Soviet Union and Islamists as being evil. This interpretation was aided by their Christian faiths which meant both men believed the US was full-filling a purpose laid on it by God and that God was therefore on their side, thus placing the conflict in a uniquely religious context. So if Truman and Bush shared the same understanding of the enemy it invites the question of whether they would fight the enemy the same way.

# Chapter III: Strategy for Victory- The Truman Doctrine and The Bush Doctrine

*"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"*

-President Truman announcing the Truman Doctrine to the US Congress in 1947

(Truman 1947a)

*"The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people"*

-President Bush's National Security Strategy 2002 (Bush 2002b)

The Truman Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine, better known as the National Security Strategy for the United States 2002, outlined US strategy for fighting the US enemies of communism and terrorism respectively. Many of Bush's critics suggest that the Bush Doctrine illustrates a departure from traditional US foreign policy, by which they mean Cold War policy which was formulated by Truman and maintained by all his predecessors. But I think there is compelling evidence to suggest that the Bush Doctrine has followed in the tradition of the Truman Doctrine and that essentially the Bush Doctrine advocates the same policy for victory as the Truman Doctrine. In order to illustrate this I have looked at the four main principles of the Bush Doctrine, which are military primacy, promoting democracy, unilateralism and pre-emption, to see if they draw parallels with the Truman Doctrine.



## **Military primacy**

The first pillar of the Bush Doctrine is a “commitment to maintaining an enduring and unassailable military primacy” (Singh 2006 p20) to “dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing a military build-up” (Rice in Stelzer 2004 p83). The Doctrine requires the “US vigorously to preserve and enhance its global military pre-eminence” (Singh 2006 p20) believing this to be the surest route for securing the peace. As well as realising that US military primacy would deter potential enemies from attempting to mount a military challenge the Bush administration also knew that it would mean the US “using force on behalf of others so they will not need to develop potent military establishments of their own” (Jervis 2005 p92) and so “would rely on the US to use force to defend them from threats” (Singh 2006 p20), much as Western Europe had done during the Cold War.

The Truman Doctrine encourages US military build-up too. Following the on-set of the Cold War the Truman Administration realised that the “United States would have to reconstitute its military power and to project it all over the world to assure American dominance” (Cohen 2005 p4) over that of the Soviets, as demonstrated by Truman’s decision to commit US troops to Korea and Vietnam to fight against communists. In his March 1947 address to Congress Truman “was calling upon them to do something never done before in peacetime: approve a massive military [and economic] foreign assistance programme that would involve the United States in European political and military affairs” (Jones 1989 p1). The US was offering to aid military defence for Europe, which would be extended and formalised by the Truman Administration’s creation of the military alliance NATO in 1949, because it knew much of Europe could not afford to

defend itself. Like the Truman administration, the Bush administration called for a military build-up to deter its aggressors and to protect its allies.

### **Democratization**

The Bush Doctrine states that the US must “spread democracy worldwide and promote the development of “free and open societies on every continent” (Lieber & Lieber 2002 p4) and promises to “stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people” (Bush 2002b). The Bush Doctrine is explicit in its belief that the US has a duty to spread democracy by stating that it is “seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe” (Bush 2002b) and that it seeks to “create conditions in which people can claim a freer future for themselves” (Rice in Stelzer 2004 p86). And it does so, in part, because of a belief that “freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation” (Bush 2003), and the US should “lead in this great mission” (Bush 2002b), as it stands as the beacon of freedom. The Bush Doctrine also uses realist reasons for wanting to spread democracy, claiming national security issues. There was strong reason to believe that the cause of 9/11 was “the culture of tyranny in the Middle East, which spawns fanatical, aggressive, secular and religious despotisms” (Kaufman 2007 p1) and the “remedy is “the advance of freedom, especially in the Middle East” (Kaufman 2007 p1), hence regime change in Iraq. Bush reaffirmed this belief in the need for democratization to ensure national interest in 2004, stating that “America has always been less secure when freedom is in retreat. America always is more secure when freedom is on the march” (Jervis 2005 p80) which is “why spreading stable, liberal democracy is in the American interest” (Kaufman 2007 p4).

Truman is explicit in his belief that the US should promote democracy across the globe, for the same reasons as Bush. Truman reports that the US must support the spread of democracy and it has a duty to do so to, as he states “that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (Truman 1947a). Like the Bush Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine believes that the US should lead in this mission as “no other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support” (Truman 1947a). Truman believed that the principles of freedom and liberty were universal and so the US should “assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way” (Truman 1947a). But like Bush, Truman’s reasons for encouraging global democratization were not entirely selfless but rooted in US security. Truman believed it was “totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples” that undermined “the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States”-the same issue posed by German and Japan during World War II” (Gaddis 2005 p64). Truman proclaims that the US must make strides to assist struggling democracies because if they falter “we may endanger the peace of the world- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation” (Truman 1947a).

### **Unilateralism**

The Bush administration has been accused of acting alone with regards to its foreign policy, in what amounts to one of the biggest differences between the Bush Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine. Many critics argued that the Bush Doctrine called for “the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions” (Lantis and Moskowitz in Carter 2005 p94) with the war in Iraq being the best example of this. They point to Bush’s statement that the US “will not hesitate to act

alone” (Bush 2002b) in defending itself and its interests and the Bush Doctrine certainly signaled “the tilt of US policy towards a more unilateral approach” (Singh 2006 p15)

Bush is not a unilateralist, but rather he “treats appeals to the UN as contingent on how well UN actions will meet US national security objectives” (Lynch & Singh 2008 p103), the same as Truman. This is not the same as acting unilaterally, despite Bush’s critics attempts to define it as such. Critics define the Iraq war as a unilateral war because it was not UN-sanctioned and claim that for all the efforts of others Afghanistan is not a joint venture. But what of the “coalition of the willing” that includes the United Kingdom and Australia, which are fighting along side the US in Iraq? What of the twenty-one nations that make up the Multi-National Force in Iraq? Similarly, the Afghanistan War is not a US solo effort but rather a NATO fought war. And we should not be surprised by these multilateral actions because Bush promised as much in the Bush Doctrine, with his statements calling for the US to “invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions” (Bush 2002b) and announcement “that the United States would like to work with traditional alliances and international institutions wherever possible” (Fukuyama 2006 p82), and it often has done with regards to “axis-of-evil” states such North Korea, where it has been involved in the six party talks and has urged China to put pressure on North Korea, and with Iran where it has worked with France, Britain and Germany in applying diplomatic pressure on Iran, as well as cooperating with the UN to put together a incentive package for Iran to encourage it to stop its uranium enrichment programme. But at the same time, the Bush administration “will not hesitate to act alone” and nor has it.

Truman was an ardent supporter of multilateralism and collective security. This is evident from his support for the creation of the United Nations in 1947, the Marshall Plan in 1947, involvement in creating the NATO alliance in 1949, and his decision to seek immediate UN support for the Korean War. In the Truman Doctrine, much like the Bush Doctrine, Truman constantly makes reference to the United Nations, calling for the US not to allow “violation of the Charter of the United Nations” (Truman 1947a) and that US help for free nations to maintain their freedom means the “United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (Truman 1947a). But for all his support for multilateralism it was not without condition. Because whilst the Truman administration publicly “affirmed the US commitment to collective security and multilateralism; privately, they acknowledged that the United States might have to act unilaterally” (Leffler 2004 p23) and this is evident in the Truman Doctrine. Truman announces his intention to by-pass the United Nations with regards to Greece and Turkey’s economic recovery and gives his reason for doing so;

“We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required” (Truman 1947a)

The Truman Doctrine is evidence of Truman’s willingness to act without multilateral institutions. He defended his actions though, stating that by acting the US is giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the UN, and he was working the cooperation of Britain. Sounds familiar? The Bush administration went to war in Iraq without UN support, but did so claiming it was defending the UN, as the “conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to

the authority of the United Nations” (Bush 2002a), and it did so with the cooperation of Britain.

Both Bush and Truman supported multilateral action, but as long as it was contingent with US interests. Truman still remains a much more multilateral president than Bush, as the evidence illustrates, but Truman stated that he too would work dependently of the UN if needs be and indeed he did. Henry Kissinger makes an interesting observation with regards to the Truman Doctrine stating that by promising to defend “independent countries, the United States was acting on behalf of democracy and the world community, even though a Soviet veto would prevent formal endorsement by the United Nations” (Kissinger 1994 p452), suggesting that Truman may well have been prepared not to receive formal endorsement from the UN during his presidency.

### **Preemption**

The Bush Doctrine promotes preemption and the Truman Doctrine does not. Truman advocated a policy of containment and deterrence whereas the very action of preemption suggests a refutation of such tactics. But although Bush carried out preemptive acts such as the Iraq war, it did not mean he would not use containment and deterrence against other potential enemies.

Bush’s decision to use preemption is clear and definite. His intentions are “to hit enemies first, before they could mount attacks on the United States” (Keller & Mitchell 2006 p5), and he states this in the Bush Doctrine, saying that the US will “exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively” (Bush 2002b). By doing this Bush “championed a proactive doctrine of preemption and de-emphasized the reactive strategies of deterrence and containment” (Lantis and Moskowitz in Carter 2005 p94).

And he did so because of a belief that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents” (Bush 2002b). Bush acknowledges that during the Cold War “deterrence was an effective defense” (Bush 2002b) but that “deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations” (Bush 2002b).

But Bush is also not completely closed to the idea of containment and deterrence either. Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s then National Security Adviser, stressed that NSS 2002 “does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence” (Rice in Stelzer 2004 p82) and stated that “these strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed where appropriate” (Rice in Stelzer 2004 p82). In his study of the Bush Doctrine John Lewis Gaddis argues that Bush “insists that preemption must be added to- though not necessarily in all situations replace- the task of containment and deterrence” (Gaddis 2002 p52). There are also arguments that “a more explicit policy of preemption actually reinforces deterrence by putting other countries on notice about America’s seriousness of purpose in addressing threats” (Steinberg et al 2002). The suggestion is that “if anything, the Strategy actually broadens the role of deterrence in US national security policy” (Daalder et al 2002) because “it flatly states the US military must be able to “deter threats against US interests, allies and friends” (Daalder et al 2002).

Although the Bush Doctrine does indeed still adhere to containment and deterrence, its primary strategy is preemption, and this is made quite apparent throughout the Bush Doctrine. And the suggestion that preemption is in itself a form of deterrence seems a fortunate coincidence for the Bush administration at best. Bush clearly advocates

preemption over the Truman tools of containment and deterrence, but that does not mean he completely neglects to use containment and deterrence. But when facing an enemy that neither fears death nor economic or military repercussions, the tools of containment and deterrence seem almost redundant , at least in the eyes of the Bush administration. The very fact that the Bush administration chose preemptive war over the policy of containment that had been pursued against Iraq for the last twelve years, illustrates as much.

But these four pillars are not the only areas of similarity in the Truman Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine. According to both the issue of poverty is one of the main reasons the US is facing an enemy. The Bush Doctrine announces that “poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist attacks” (Bush 2002b), and believes that the US “should promote the economic development of poor countries both as an end in itself and as a complement to U.S efforts to promote democracy, since democracy is much easier to consolidate against the backdrop of economic growth” (Fukuyama 2006 p141). The Truman Doctrine also believes that poverty in Greece and Turkey is the root cause of communist up-risings there. Like Bush, Truman accepts that democracy is more likely to flourish when there is economic growth so US assistance “should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political process” (Jones 1989 pviii). Which is why the Marshall plan, which was “a logical outcome of the Truman Doctrine” (Frank in Osgood et al 1970 p243), was launched to “counter the communist threat to Western Europe by aiding in its recovery and rehabilitation” (Frank in Osgood et al 1970 p243), through financial aid.



Also, both Doctrines have followed the same foreign policy traditions as they “married a belief in Wilsonian ideals to a conviction in realist means” (Lynch & Singh 2008 p271). When Truman announced the Truman Doctrine he “spoke in traditional Wilsonian terms of a struggle between two ways of life” (Kissinger 1994 p452) but he was committed to the realist tools of containment and deterrence to achieve it. The Bush Doctrine also spoke in Wilsonian terms but insisted on using US hard power to achieve such ends, and “Wilsonian ends were thus married to hard-headed, realist means” (Singh 2006 p18). Both Doctrines were “unafraid to project American power or American values” (Singh 2006 p18) and in fact “saw the combination as inextricably linked for the preservation of American security” (Singh 2006 p18). The “insistence upon identifying America’s security with her purpose...is apparent in the Truman Doctrine” (Tucker in Osgood et al 1970 p48) whilst in the Bush Doctrine “Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism had been melded into a new hybrid” (Singh 2006 p18), again illustrating that US security and the promotion of US values are linked.

## Chapter IV: Korea vs. Iraq

*“Like Iraq, Korea was seen as a war of choice by many of Harry Truman’s critics. Like Iraq, an initial American military success was subsequently countered with major regional powers playing a crucial role in reversing the American gains. Like Iraq, by the time Truman left office, the war seemed mired in an intractable position and had eroded the president’s standing in America and the world...”*

Lynch & Singh (2008 P151)

Whilst many of Bush’s critics have compared the Iraq War with the Vietnam War, I believe the Korean War is more comparable with the Iraq War. I think that Bush has used Truman’s Korean War as a blueprint for the Iraq War, and that the decisions and conduct of the Iraq War have been based on the Korean War, and I have focused on four key areas which demonstrate this.

### **Reasons for war: a wider context**

Firstly, in both the Korean War and the Iraq War the US intervened for apparently defensive reasons. Truman intervened in Korea in defence of South Korea against North Korean aggression whilst Bush intervened in Iraq over concerns that Saddam Hussein had WMD’s which constituted a direct threat against the US and its interests. Despite the fact that the Iraq War was a pre-emptive war, and by that very nature appears to be an act of aggression “it is justified by its advocates on the grounds of past Iraqi aggressions” (Hitchens 2003 p45). In both cases the US was acting defensively against the aggressive actions of a hostile state.

Both wars began for realist reasons, to ensure the security of the US and its interests, but upon achieving this new liberal objective merged. Truman intervened in

South Korea because it was in the interest of the US for South Korea to remain a democracy. But after pushing the North Koreans back behind the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel “many U.S leaders looked forward to crossing the parallel and uniting the peninsula” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p428) with the aim of the “liberation of Korea” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p428). Bush intervened in Iraq because of concern that Saddam possessed or was attempting to possess weapons of mass destruction. Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction dominated every public justification for war given by the president and other administration officials” (Daalder and Lindsay 2003 p146). But having over-thrown Saddam and the Baathist regime the Bush administration set about transforming Iraq into a liberal democracy, and this became the long-term objective for the US in Iraq.

Also, these wars were fought as proxy wars. Truman could not attack the Soviet Union directly because of fear of igniting a nuclear war between the two super powers. So he instead he attacked the North Koreans who he believed were a satellite of the Soviet Union. The State Department believed that “the North Korean government “is absolutely under Kremlin control and [thus this] move against South Korea must be considered a Soviet move” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p420). Bush too could not attack al-Qaeda, the terrorist group whom had been responsible for the 9/11 attacks, because they were a stateless organization and had cells in countries ranging from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Northern Africa. But Iraq was considered a prominent state sponsor of terrorism and Saddam himself admitted as much in a “July 1978 interview with Newsweek, acknowledging that “regarding the Palestinians, its no secret; Iraq is open to them and they are free to train and plan [terrorist attacks] here” (Pauly and Lansford 2005 p30). There is also evidence of his relationship with al-Qaeda in a memo

from the Bush administration to the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 2003, which states that Saddam offered financial backing to al Qaeda and suggested “that Iraq regularly trained al Qaeda operatives in the conduct of terrorist operations” (Pauly and Lansford 2005 p31).

Korea and Iraq were also wars that were fought in the hope of providing regional stability. The US fought in Korea to prevent South Korea from falling to communism for fear that should South Korea fall, then it would inevitable result in the rest of Asia falling, in “an economic and political [but] not a military domino theory” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p415). There was concern that if South Korea were to fall then this would “lead to a fundamental alignment of forces in favour of the Soviet Union throughout that part of the world” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p415). Following the Fall of China the previous year the US could not afford to lose more of Asia and so had to contain communism in Korea.

Bush intervened in Iraq with the hope that this would provide regional stability in the Middle-East, although whereas Truman sought to maintain a balance in order to achieve stability, Bush encouraged “roll-back” to achieve regional stability. Richard Perle, a Bush advisor, believed Iraq to be “the best place to test the proposition that a properly civic culture in Arab countries can lead to democratic institutions” (Halper and Clarke 2004 p155) and believed “there is tremendous potential to transform the region” (Halper and Clarke 2004 p156). The Bush administration “had adopted the notion of remaking the Middle East “neighbourhood” and Iraq seemed to offer the best prospect for initiating the effort” (Halper and Clarke 2004 p156). Both Truman and Bush intervened in the hope of creating greater regional stability.

Both men also went to war to illustrate US resolve and defiance against international threats and to prevent the emergence of future threats. Truman believed the US had to intervene in Korea because “appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately to war” (McCullough 1992 p784). He believed the US should support the South Koreans because “if the Soviet Union could get away with aggression in Korea, it would probably strike in other areas as well” (Donovan 1982 p194). The US had to stand up against Soviet aggression to illustrate its resolve to the Soviets and to deter future aggression.

The Bush administration also believed that the US should not appease its enemies but should stand up against them to deter further attacks. Bush and his advisers “believed that Osama bin laden and his followers thought they could push the United States out of their way of a simple reason- America’s lack of resolve” (Daalder and Lindsay 2003 p81). Vice-president Dick Cheney believed that those who had died on 9/11 had “paid the price for Washington’s failure to respond forcefully to previous attacks” (Daalder and Lindsay 2003 p81) and that “weakness is provocative, that it kind of invites people to do things that they otherwise wouldn’t think about doing” (Daalder and Lindsay 2003 p82). The war in Iraq was meant to illustrate to others that the US would stand up to aggression. And it seems to have work, with the attack occurring in conjunction with Pakistan’s condemnation of the Taliban regime in Kabul and Libya’s decision to stop its uranium enrichment programme.

### **International approval: Unilateral action disguised as multilateral action**

At first glance it seems preposterous to suggest that Truman and Bush shared the same understanding of multilateral action, mainly because Truman is considered a hero of

multilateralism whilst Bush an enemy of any multilateral efforts. But there is no denying that both Truman and Bush sought UN approval for their wars and did so for the same reason; for public opinion rather than any deep-seated obligation to recognising international law.

Truman immediately sought UN support to intervene in Korea and he successful got it, but only because the Soviet Union were boycotting the UN Security Council at the time. The UN declared “the North Korean attack a “breach of the peace” (Lacey 1989 p410) and called on nations to repel the attack. But “the UN moves were the thinnest of facades for what was an American action peripherally supported by Britain” (Cochran 1973 p315). It was a “US-directed UN command” (Lacey 1989 p410) and General MacArthur, the UN commander for Korea “was under the direction of the American Joint Chiefs and State and Defense secretaries” (Cochran 1973 p316). The “UN exercised no authority over the actual conduct of the war” (Lacey 1989 p411) and the decision “to throw in American naval and air forces, as continuing crucial decisions, was made unilaterally, with the UN then falling or being pushed into line” (Cochran 1973 p316). Although Truman was an advocate of multilateralism, the Korean War provided an example of collective security becoming “a pseudohumanitarian mantle with which America, with a dependant Britain and France in tow, clothed her intervention” (Cochran 1973 p316). Truman used Korea as an opportunity to “transform the UN into an anti-Soviet mobilization” (Cochran 1973 p316) and “far from bolstering the UN, the action nearly ripped it apart” (Cochran 1973 p316). This was in part because of serious questions over the legality of the US led intervention; firstly, claims that Article 32 of the UN Charter had been violated as North Korean was not invited to sit as a temporary

member in the UN, claims that the conflict did not fall under the UN Charter because it was a civil war, and the legalistic issue of voting for intervention without the consent of all five members of the Security Council.

In September 2002 Bush went to the UN to demand that Saddam Hussein permit weapons inspectors back into Iraq and to cease production and use of weapons of mass destruction, in compliance with post-Gulf War resolutions. It had become apparent that despite many peoples fears, the “United States had decided to work through the United Nations rather than act alone” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005 p137). After eight weeks of intense debate and discussions “the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote of 15 to 0” (Woodward 2002 p353), which called on Iraq to “declare and disarm itself of all weapons of mass destruction and threatened undefined “serious consequences if it did not comply” (Woodward 2002 p353). Saddam complied with the resolution and the weapons inspectors headed to Iraq, lead by Hans Blix who “condemned Iraq for not having a real commitment to disarmament and for impeding the progress of inspectors” (Pauly and Lansford 2005 p73), but also failed to find any WMD’s. The US however believed “that no “smoking gun” was needed and instead, Iraqi non-compliance was enough to justify military action” (Pauly and Lindsay 2005 p77), and the US, UK and Spain planned to push forward the “eighteenth resolution” to call for military action against Iraq, but upon realising that it would never be passed by the UN, they abandoned it, and took matters into their own hands.

Like Truman in Korea, Bush wanted UN approval to intervene in Iraq. He was unsuccessful, but his efforts should not be dismissed. And like Truman, he did not go to the UN because of a commitment to international law but to establish a favourable world

opinion. Many reports suggest that Bush went to the UN for the sake of British Prime Minister Tony Blair because “public opinion in the U.K. favoured trying to make international institutions work before resorting to force” (Woodward 2004 p177). Bush “only went through the motions of giving a wholehearted endorsement to Mr Blair’s attempts to gain full UN approval for military action” (Woolf 2006) in exchange for a UK commitment to send troops to Iraq. By agreeing to Blair’s “urging to go to the UN, Bush had improved his position immeasurably” (Woodward 2004 p178) because in exchange for this Blair had promised a commitment of UK troops, so “it meant that no matter what happened, as long as Blair kept his word, he would not have to go it alone” (Woodward 2004 p179).

### **Liberators or a liability? US success and US failure**

Both Korea and Iraq began with little preparation and minimal planning, in part because of an emphasis on the need for limited war. Both conflicts began well for the US, with military success almost immediately, but very quickly US troops would encounter increasing levels of violence as a result of the influence of regional powers, and this would lead to the war becoming increasingly unpopular. But the US president would remain adamant that the US must stay the course and would do so, leaving it to their successor to resolve the problem.

Truman made the decision to go to war quickly and with minimal preparation. The Korean War began on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1950 following the invasion of South Korea by the North and “propelled the Truman administration during the next five days to intervene in what was basically an ongoing revolution and civil war” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p410). Questions were raised as to what “accounted for the almost instantaneous decision of the



administration to set the wheels of war in motion before the military or political situation was clear” (Cochran 1973 p312), such was the speed of Truman’s decision to go to war. Bush too was accused of going to war too quickly in Iraq. Major General Gene Renuart, who was the operations director, was told to prepare for war “as early as April or May, just five months away, when “it normally took two years or maybe three years to write a war plan” (Woodward 2004 p43). Bob Woodward, who had exclusive access to the Bush administration in the build-up to war, said that “the suggestion took Renuart’s breath away” (Woodward 2004 p43) and that “the thought of starting a war against Iraq in the spring was daunting” (Woodward 2004 p43).

Truman and Bush both wanted to conduct limited wars. George Kennan wanted a “limited rather than total war” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p417) due in part to worry “about the Soviets or their proxies nibbling away parts of the free world” (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p417) whilst the US was distracted in total war. Truman’s “first concern was keeping it a limited war” (McCullough 1992 p804), so US involvement in Korea initially began with the commitment of just US air and naval forces to help support the South Korean troops, before the introduction of a small contingent of US troops who had travelled over from Japan. The Iraq war too began as a limited war, under the order of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld spoke of “transformation” of the military which included smaller troop deployments, and he “wanted to ensure that the deployed force was as small as possible” (Jaffe 2003) and his guidance to the military planners was “keep it small, the smallest you can get away with” (Woodward 2004 p80). Rumsfeld wanted a limited war and he got it, as US military strategy existed of a much

smaller deployment of troops and a greater reliance on air power, just like the limited war of Korea.

Truman's involvement in North Korea began very successfully following Gen. MacArthur's amphibious landing at Inchon, which took the North Korean's completely by surprise. The "operation was an overwhelming success that completed turned the tables on the enemy" (McCullough 1992 p798) and in the summer and early autumn of 1950 "US troops and their South Korean allies began winning battles" (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p410). However, after the decision to cross the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and unify Korea was made, the US faced opposition from Chinese "volunteers" who "massively entered the war and routed the United Nations forces" (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p411). Soon "after this bloody turn of the tide, the war became unpopular in the United States" (Bernstein in Lacey 1989 p411) and the American public demanded the withdrawal of US troops from Korea. But Truman remained adamant that US troops must remain in South Korea to ensure the security of the US, and he did keep them, leaving the potential resolution of the conflict up to his successor.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was a fantastic success too, and within three weeks the US had successfully overthrown Saddam Hussein and the Baath party. But post-war Iraq soon posed more problems than the initial invasion, as levels of violence and unrest escalated, mostly directed at US troops. The US government blamed the Iranian government for encouraging Shiite insurgencies in Iraq, following a series of Shiite suicide attacks against US troops and the Sunni population of Iraq. As the violence and body-count increased so too did the American public's calls for US troop withdrawal. But Bush ignored such calls, insisting that the US must "stay the course" to ensure both Iraq's

security and that of the US. Now, with just two months to go until the next presidential election and with Bush showing no signs of withdrawing troops, it is a certainty that the war will still be being waged as the next US president is being sworn in to Office.

### **Civil War: the Commander-in-Chief vs. the military**

Truman had perhaps the most infamous falling out with the military in US history after he was forced to sack General Douglas MacArthur from his position as UN commander during the Korean War. MacArthur had been successful in pushing the North Koreans back across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel in the initial stages of the war, but the Chinese warned that “should American troops enter North Korea, China would come into the war” (Cochran 1973 p320). MacArthur however, continued to push US troops northward and China became involved in the war and “flooded the peninsula with several hundred thousand troops and pushed the United States, the South Koreans and the coalition forces back 300 miles” (Walsh 2007). With the prospect of a war against China looming the US began preparing to arrange a cease-fire whilst MacArthur, who believed that a US withdrawal “would represent “the greatest defeat of the free world” (Cochran 1973 p323), without any notice to Washington, issued an ultimatum to the Chinese warning that “if the Chinese did not accede, allied action “would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse” (Cochran 1973 p326). In making such a statement MacArthur “had pushed the contest to the point where the President’s constitutional authority was under avowed challenge and his hand was forced” (Cochran 1973 p327). Truman felt he had little choice but to fire MacArthur who had publicly disagreed and defied his plans for Korea and in doing so had undermined the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

Bush too replaced his chief military generals in Iraq when it became apparent that their strategy for Iraq differed greatly from his. In early 2007 Bush replaced the US commander in the Middle-east, Gen. John Abizaid with Adm. William Fallon and the US commander in Iraq Gen. George Casey with Gen. David Petraeus, as a result of the president and his top generals having disagreements “regarding a surge of troops into Iraq” (Walsh 2007). By 2007 it had become apparent that “Bush had not been happy with the military’s advice” (Abramowitz et al 2007) and Philip Zelikow, a State Department counsellor, stated that Bush “wasn’t satisfied with the recommendations he was getting, and he thought we need a strategy that was more purposeful and likely to succeed” (Abramowitz et al 2007), hence the surge of troops. But his generals had been less than supportive of increasing the US presence in Iraq and in November 2006 Gen. Abizaid had said that “adding US troops was not the answer for Iraq” (Abramowitz et al 2007). Just two months later Bush had replaced such dissenting voices as “part of a broad revamping of the military team that will carry out the administrations new Iraq strategy” (Gordon and Shanker 2007) and senior White House officials stated that the appointment “of General Petraeus was part of a broader effort to change almost all of the top American officials in Iraq as Mr. Bush changes his strategy there” (Gordon and Shanker 2007). It was apparent that Bush’s’ “removal of his top generals in early January seemed based on a Truman-like conviction that the top brass need to be on the same page as the president” (Walsh 2007)., and as this chapter has illustrated, much of the Iraq war was conducted by Bush with a Truman-like conviction. White House spokesman “Tony Snow said that President Bush thinks Iraq will develop along the lines of “a Korean model”

(Kaplan 20007) and this certainly seems apparent with regards to the reasons for war, the courting of the international world, the military strategy, and relations with the military.

## Chapter V: Domestic Policy

*“In the State of the Union Message of January 6 1947, I stated that I would communicate with the Congress in the near future with reference to the establishment of a single department of national defense.”*

President Truman speaking to a joint session of Congress (Truman1947)

*“I ask the Congress to join me in creating a single, permanent department with an overriding and urgent mission: securing the homeland of America, and protecting the American people.”*

President Bush speaking to a joint session of Congress (C-Span 2002)

The nature of the enemy called for the creation of government departments and the passing of laws for the purpose of rooting out enemies. During the Truman era there was a constant fear about Soviet espionage activity in the US and in particular of communist sympathisers working within the federal government, as illustrated by Senator Joe McCarthy's anti-communist crusade against the Truman administration during the early 1950's. During the Bush presidency there has been a constant fear regarding potential terrorist activities and the planning and execution of terrorist attacks from within the US. Unlike traditional warfare the US's enemy could seemingly subvert itself into American society, operating undetected from within the homeland, as was apparent with the infamous case of the Rosenberg's, an American couple executed after being found guilty of conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union during Truman's presidency, and the revelations that some of the 9/11 hijackers had taken flying

lessons in the US. Therefore, both Truman and Bush took the necessary actions to ensure that the US was able to investigate any suspicious activities committed by its citizens.

On July 25<sup>th</sup> 1947 Congress passed Truman's National Security Act, a piece of legislation that Truman had been striving for since becoming president. The National Security Act of 1947 "mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the US Government" (US State Departmentb) and its primary purpose "was to unify the armed services under a single Department of Defence and a single Secretary of Defense" (McCullough 1992 p566) and it "also established the Air Force as a separate military service, set up a new National Security Council, and gave formal authorization to the Central Intelligence Agency" (McCullough 1992 p566). Until World War II many of the various departments involved in US defence had been working separately, but during "World War II the military services had had to cooperate in unprecedented ways" (Prados 1991 p29) and so support began for unification of the services. The support increased following "the emergence of the Soviet threat and the inability of war-weakened Britain to do much about it" (Jeffreys-Jones 1989 p24) and convinced many that the US defence services would have to work closer together and become a more efficient organisation to counter the threat. Some pointed to the Pearl Harbour attack as proof of the problems of the existing system, as the Navy suffered from the consequences of a lack of intelligence, mirroring accusations made in the investigations into 9/11, whilst "Undersecretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal advocated closer coordination between the armed forces, in emulation of the British war cabinet system" (Jeffreys-Jones 1989 p24) which had been so effective, in the same way

that government officials called for the creation of a US department focusing on domestic terrorism based on Britain's MI5 following the September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 attacks.

In November 2002 "Congress and the Bush administration created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to better coordinate federal, state, and local anti-terror efforts" (Bennett & Shambaugh 2006 p212). It was headed by DHS Secretary Tom Ridge and combined existing government agencies and was created after investigations of the 9/11 attacks revealed that the US intelligent agencies failed to share information effectively, which could have prevented the attacks. The new department "would merge twenty-two agencies, employ nearly 170,000 workers, spend more than \$35 billion annually, and become the federal government's third largest bureaucracy" (Daalder & Lindsay 2003 p94). In creating the DHS "Bush initiated the largest reorganization of the executive branch since the Defense Department was established early in the Cold War" (Arnold in Schier 2004 p156) and it is apparent that Truman's reorganisation of defence agencies influenced Bush. When announcing his initial proposal for a cabinet-level DHS Bush referred to Truman's reorganisation of the defence agencies on several occasions. He stated that "Harry Truman recognized that our nation's fragmented defenses had to be reorganized to win the Cold War" (C-Span 2002) and that "Truman's reforms are still helping us to fight terror abroad, and now we need similar dramatic reforms to secure our people at home" (C-Span 2002) before asking the Congress to "create a new department of government" (C-Span 2002). Truman's decisions to bring US defence under one department no doubt influenced Bush to bring US domestic defence under one department too.



In 1947 Truman signed Executive Order 9835, otherwise known as The Loyalty Order. The Loyalty Order authorised “a loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian employment of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government” (Truman1947b). The investigation included reference to an applicants school/college records, references from the applicant and their former employers, FBI and military/naval files, police files, and files from any other appropriate source and an employee could be fired if “reasonable doubt” existed concerning their loyalty. The creation of The Loyalty Order resulted in much controversy. Critics pointed to the legalistic issue surroundings The Loyalty Order, with the main problem being “the indefiniteness of the standards which it sets up for determining disloyalty” (Schrenk Jr 1948, p949) and that “such vagueness in itself has been held sufficient to deny due process” (Schrenk Jr 1949, p949). The determination made under the Loyalty Order was “not whether an employee has committed illegal or harmful acts, but whether “reasonable grounds” exist for believing that he is “disloyal” (Durr 1949, p298). There was also wide spread concern that the investigations were an impingement of the basic freedom of belief that the US Constitution allowed for.

Despite the controversy Truman insisted that The Loyalty Order was necessary and justified it on the basis that “it is of vital importance that persons employed in the Federal service be of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States” (Truman 1947b).

The USA PATRIOT Act, a Bush administration initiative, was passed by a large majority in Congress just 45 days after 9/11. The title of the Act stood for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and

Obstruct Terrorism, and it “greatly expands the ability of law enforcement officers to conduct surveillance and detain suspects” (Bennett & Shambaugh 2006 p227). It’s key provisions was “removing or loosening constraints on government capabilities to collect intelligence” (Halper & Clarke 2004 p286) on individuals thus giving “the federal government broad powers to detain noncitizens, wiretap cell phones, intercept emails and monitor internet usage” (White & Zogby in Schier 2004 p88), and much like Truman’s Loyalty Order, and the Patriot Act courted controversy for the same reasons the Loyalty Order had.

Firstly, critics were concerned over the vagueness of the Patriot Act, as “terrorist organizations” is wholly undefined” (Cole in Bennett & Shambaugh 2006 p233) in the legislation, and, like the Loyalty Act, such vagueness denies due process. Similarly, critics were concerned that government agencies were allowed to “infringe on the privacy and civil liberties of American citizens” (Arnold in Schier 2004 p154) both by their means of investigation and because the legislation “indulges in guilt by association” (Cole in Bennett & Shambaugh 2006 p230) which violates the First Amendment “because people have a right to associate with groups that have lawful and unlawful ends” (Cole in Bennett & Shambaugh 2006 p233) and the Fifth Amendment “because “in our jurisprudence guilt is personal” (Cole in Bennett & Shambaugh 2006 p233). But the Bush administration remained adamant that such measures were needed to prevent any further attacks.

# Conclusion

*“The war on terror-the Second Cold War-has had its Truman.”*

- Lynch & Singh (2008)

The aim of this dissertation was to analyse how much, if at all, the Bush administrations foreign policy has been influenced by the Truman administration. I think there is much reason to suggest, as this dissertation does, Bush’s foreign policy has been very influenced by Truman. Both Bush and Truman understood the battle they faced in ideological terms, against an enemy that was seeking to replace the American way of life, with all its promise of freedom and capitalism, with a tyrannous and “evil” regime. They proposed a strategy to fight this enemy, out-lined in the Truman Doctrine and Bush Doctrine, which mainly consisted of combining military primacy and a determined effort to encourage the spread of democracy to combat the enemy. This strategy was realised in the Korean War and the Iraq War, as examples of their doctrines and their developed policies in action. Finally, they both knew that the nature of the enemy meant it was able to operate, un-noticed, within the USA, as illustrated by McCarthyism under Truman and the training of the 9/11 hijackers in the US. So they introduced a series of new government agencies and new laws to combat these enemies of the state and in doing so faced accusations that they were encroaching on the very civil liberties they claimed to be defending.

But this dissertation is not entirely conclusive. Because for all their similarities in foreign policy, as this dissertation illustrates, there are still important areas of difference between the two. Bush advocated a policy of pre-emption and Truman did not. This remains a huge difference between the two, in part, because of the gravity and

seriousness of pre-emptive action. Truman made it clear in the Truman Doctrine and later NSC-68 that he believed in using containment. Bush has not shown such belief in containment, not because he chooses not to, but because of arguments that it will not work against those who seek martyrdom, which is why pre-emption is preferred. Similarly, for all his talk of multilateralism, Bush remains a president more defined by his unilateralism than his ability to abide by international institutions and law. And despite moments of unilateral thinking Truman was a multilateralist, there is just too much evidence, such as the creation of NATO, European Recovery Programme, and involvement in the UN, to suggest otherwise. But the aim of this dissertation was to seek *how far* we can understand the Bush Doctrine through the prism of the Truman Doctrine, not merely whether or not the Bush Doctrine is the Truman Doctrine.

But what is the significance of these findings? Well, one of the biggest accusations aimed at the Bush administrations is that its policies, and in particular its National Security Strategy 2002, is that it signals a radical departure from traditional US foreign policy. Traditional US foreign policy refers to the foreign policy that was used during the Cold War, which, although deviated at times, remained close to the original policies of Truman throughout. I hope that the arguments I have presented illustrate that Bush, by the very nature of using Truman's policies, has not abandoned US traditional foreign policy but rather, has continued with it. I think my dissertation has put the Bush Doctrine into a historical context which illustrates it as one of traditionalism rather than radicalism. Too often Bush has been compared with his immediate post-Cold War predecessors, his father and Bill Clinton, but to fully understand the Bush Doctrine we

must go back to Truman and then, all of a sudden, his policies do not look like so much of a departure.

I think this dissertation also poses a broader question, which concerns the legacy of George W. Bush's foreign policy. Harry Truman was deeply unpopular when he left Office, so unpopular in fact that he decided against running for another term, and it was mostly a result of what was perceived as a failed foreign policy and the involvement of US troops in a war far away that nobody really understood the purpose of. But for all these supposed flaws, his foreign policy strategy continued to be used by all his predecessors, from Dwight Eisenhower to Ronald Reagan, before culminating in US victory over the Soviet Union. It was only upon revising Truman's foreign policy that historians began to voice their appreciation and approval of Truman's efforts, and now he ranks very highly in US presidential polls. It raises the question of whether in another generation Bush will be considered in a similar vein. For example, whilst both presidential candidates for the 2008 elections, Democrat Barack Obama and Republican John McCain, criticise Bush's foreign policy, neither of them have repudiated that the War on Terror must continue. Republican McCain wants to continue with the Iraq War and has stated he remains open to the possibility of military action against the pariah state of Iran. And even Obama, for all his liberalism, looks set to use some Bush-like policies, with his threats to bomb the Islamic state of Pakistan, and although he wishes to withdraw troops from Iraq it is not with the intention of bringing them home, but rather to redeploy them to fight in Afghanistan against the Islamist Taliban. It is impossible to say now whether in fifty years time Bush will be considered a hero in the same vein as

Truman. But it will be interesting to see, once the War on Terror is over, if Bush's foreign policy was continued in the same way he continued Truman's.

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